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JURISDICTION AND JURY TRIALS IN ACTIONS
AGAINST FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OWNED
CORPORATIONS
To establish federal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, a United
States citizen traditionally alleged jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 A party to a diversity action against
a foreign corporation could demand a jury trial.2 In 1976, however, Con-
gress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (Act),' which pro-
vides for federal jurisdiction over the commerical acts4 of foreign states
I See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). Section 1332(a)(2) provides for federal jurisdiction
over suits brought by United States citizens against citizens or subjects of a foreign state.
Id. Traditionally, foreign corporations, even those owned by foreign governments, were con-
sidered citizens or subjects of a foreign state for the purposes of § 1332. See, e.g., Barrow
S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898) (British corporation a foreign citizen subject to
diversity jurisdiction); National S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118,121 (1882) (British corpora-
tion a foreign citizen); Eck v. United Arab Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 806-11 (2d Cir. 1966)
(diversity jurisdiction allowed over foreign government owned airline); Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 534 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
983 (1966) (allowing diversity jurisdiction over airline owned by foreign government);
Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics, Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(British corporation a foreign state); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth
Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Swiss corporation a foreign
citizen subject to diversity jurisdiction). See generally, 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
.75[3] (2d ed. 1980); Vagts, The Corporate Alienw Definitional Questions in Federal
Restraints on Enterprise, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1524-51 (1961).
2 See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 534 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Koninkljke Luchtraart Maatschuppij N.V. KLM v.
Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 777-85 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Section 1332 neither specifically permits nor
denies jury trials in diversity actions, and therefore, the federal courts consistently have
allowed jury trials in actions against foreign corporations. See 346 F.2d at 535-36; 292 F.2d
at 782.
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1441, & 1602-11 (1976). Congress intended to accomplish four
objectives through the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. Con-
gress intended to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, shift the decision-
making power in sovereign immunity issues from the Executive Branch to the Judiciary,
provide a statutory procedure for serving process upon and obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns, and provide a statutory procedure for executing judgments obtained
against foreign sovereigns. Id. at 6605-06.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). The Act limits the jurisdictional immunity of foreign
states to acts which are done for public purposes of the sort in which nations traditionally
have engaged, such as the conduct of diplomatic, military, or political affairs. Id. The Act
denies immunity for acts which are done for a commercial purpose if the commercial activity
directly affects or has a substantial contact with the United States. Id. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
See generally Dellapena, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign
Immunity, 85 CoMM. L.J. 167, 230-33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dellapena]; Note, The
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and over foreign government owned corporations in section 1330.' Sec-
tion 1330 of the Act prohibits jury trials in actions against foreign cor-
porations.' In several recent cases, federal courts have divided over the
question whether section 1330 jurisdiction over foreign government
owned corporations is now exclusive of section 1332 diversity jurisdic-
tion.7 Since section 1330 prohibits jury trials, these courts also have ad-
dressed the issue whether the seventh amendment guarantees the right
to a jury trial in suits against foreign government owned corporations!
In the past, if a foreign government owned or ran a corporation,9
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 543, 550-52 (1977). Commentators have noted that the Act's restriction of
sovereign immunity will create difficult problems of interpretation in distinguishing a
foreign state's commercial and noncommercial activities. See Carl, Suing Foreign Govern-
ments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Prac-
tice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1031-35 (1979); Note, Sovereign Immunity-A Statutory Aiproach to
a Persistent Problem, 1 B.C. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 223, 261 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A
Statutory Approach].
I See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). Section 1330 grants the federal district courts
"original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action..."
against a foreign state or foreign government owned corporation which fails to qualify for
immunity under the Act. Id.
See note 5 supra.
Since the passage of the Act in 1976, four courts have held that diversity jurisdiction
over a foreign government owned corporation is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Rex v.
Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1980; Houston v. Mur-
mansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71, 75 (D. Md. 1980); Lonon v. Compania de Navegacao, Lloyd
Brasileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1979; Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36,
36-38 (D.D.C. 1979). Contra, Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A. 639 F.2d 872,
878 (2d Cir. 1981); Jones v. Shipping Corp. of Ind., 491 F. Supp. 1260, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1980);
Williams v. Shipping Corp. of Ind., 489 F. Supp. 526, 528 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Memorandum
Order); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 396 (D. Del. 1978).
' The seventh amendment requires jury trials in certain types of civil actions. See
note 74 infra. Three courts have indicated that the Act's denial of jury trials may violate the
seventh amendment. See Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459,
463-66 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Lonon v. Compania de Navegacao, Lloyd Brasileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71, 73
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D.D.C. 1979). Several
courts have held that the Act's preclusion of jury trials in actions against foreign govern-
ments and their commercial corporations does not violate the seventh amendment. See Rug-
giero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A., 639 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir. 1981); Herman v. El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 502 F. Supp. 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of
Ind., 489 F. Supp. 526, 532 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Memorandum Order). See also Houston v. Mur-
mansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71, 73 (D. Md. 1980) (construing the Act as requiring bifur-
cated trial, with court determining issues of sovereign immunity and jury determining
issues of liability and damages); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 396 (D.
Del. 1978) (the Act requires bifurcated trial).
I Since the turn of the century, many foreign governments have engaged in business
activities that are undertaken by private citizens or organizations in the United States. See
generally Allen, State Trading and Economic Warfare, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 256,
257-59 (1959); Hazard, State Trading in History and Theory, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 243,
243-55 (1959). Through the use of wholly owned corporations, foreign governments now
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sovereign immunity0 often precluded the assertion of United States
jurisdiction. In absolute form, sovereign immunity barred suits against
foreign government owned corporations whenever the suit was in real-
ity a suit against the government that owned the corporation.11 The
jurisdictional immunity of foreign government owned corporations
adversely affected United States citizens who engaged in commercial
transactions with foreign government owned corporations and also
denied recovery to United States citizens injured through torts commit-
engage in such varied commercial activities as the production or manufacture of com-
modities, mining, international shipping, and national or international air transportation.
See Friedmann, Changing Social Arrangements in State-Trading States and Their Effect
on International Law, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 350, 357-59 (1959); Timberg, Sovereign Im-
munity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 109, 109-112 (1961);
Comment, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Government-Owned Airlines, 18 J. Am L. &
COMM. 455, 457-58 (1951).
10 See generally M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 109
(3d ed. 1977); J. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (6th ed. 1963); W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 87-99 (1979). Sovereign immunity promotes comi-
ty and international accord by affirming the dignity, independence, and sovereignty of foreign
states. See United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 23942 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948); Note, 1 GA. J. INT'L & Copn. L. 133, 174
(1970); Comment, Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign-State Enterprise in Alaska, 4
UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 343, 347-48 (1975). Sovereign immunity originated in the late
medieval period as a courtesy between European monarchs. See Garcia-Mora, The Doctrine
of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and its Recent Modifications, 42 VA. L. REV. 335,
336-37 (1956); von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 33, 34-35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren]. See also D. O'CONNELL, 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW 914-15 (1965) [hereinafter cited as O'Connell]; Dobrovir, A Gloss on the
Tate Letter's Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 54 VA. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (1968).
With consistent state practice, sovereign immunity became a norm of modern international
law. See O'CONNELL, supra, at 915. United States courts traditionally emphasize the impor-
tance of sovereign immunity to international relations. See Berizzi Bros. v. B.S. Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562, 570-76 (1926); United States v. Diekeman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1876) (dictum); The
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-39 (1812). Some authorities,
however, indicate that sovereign immunity is inconsistent with modern concepts of the
responsibilities of states. See Chemical Nat. Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venez., 420 Pa.
134, 194, 215 A.2d 864, 893 (1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822
(1966); C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law 206-08 (1928); Reeves,
The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 38 FORDAm L. REV. 455, 496 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Reeves].
1 See, e.g., Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705,
707-10 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1930) (sovereign immunity granted to Royal
Administration of the Swedish State Railroad); Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d
659, 661-65 (2d Cir. 1924) (sovereign immunity granted to railroad owned and operated by
Mexican government); The Maipo, 259 F. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (sovereign immunity
granted to cargo vessel owned by Chilean government). But see U.S. v. Deutsches
Kalisndikat Geselschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (foreign government owned min-
ing corporation denied sovereign immunity in antitrust suit). See generally Hervey, The Im-
munity of Foreign States When Engaged In Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution,
27 MICH. L. REV. 751, 753 (1929).
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ted by such corporations.12 Consequently, the State Department in 1952
issued the Tate Letter, which suggested that the courts follow State
Department directives on whether to grant sovereign immunity to for-
eign states and their corporations." The Tate Letter noted that the
State Department would distinguish the public and private activities of
foreign governments and grant sovereign immunity only in suits arising
from public acts. 4 Thereafter, the courts followed State Department
directives on sovereign immunity issues,15 and utilized the Department's
public and private act distinction in cases where the Department did not
issue a directive." The Act carries forward the Tate Letter's restrictive
2 See, e.g., Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 31 (1945) (sovereign immunity
denied United States plaintiff recovery for maritime tort); Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 580
(1943) (sovereign immunity precluded recovery for breach of contract). See generally
Reeves, supra note 10, at 455-57; Recent Development, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976-Judicial Predominance, 4 BROOKLYN J. INTL L. 146, 146-47 (1977); House Report
supra note 3, at 6605.
"s See Letter from Jack B. Tate, State Department Acting Legal Advisor, to Acting
Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep't State Bull. 984-85
(1952) [hereinafter cited as the Tate Letter]. See generally Editorial Comment, New United
States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 93-106 (1953). The Tate
Letter, supra, affirmed the practice of judicial deference to the State Department in mat-
ters of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court acknowledged and followed State Depart-
ment suggestions on sovereign immunity issues on two occasions prior to 1952. See
Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945) (following suggestion of immunity when
State Department merely noted foreign sovereign's ownership of libeled vessel); Ex Parte
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587-89 (1943) (following actual suggestion of immunity).
14 See the Tate Letter, supra note 13. The Tate Letter failed to state standards for
determining whether a particular act was public or private. Id.; see Victory Transp., Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); note 16 infra.
'5 See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955); Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710, 724-26 (E.D. Va.), affd per curiam, 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th
Cir. 1961; New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684, 687
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). Commentators have criticized judicial deference to State Department direc-
tives as an improper abdication of judicial power which led to disposition of legal issues on
grounds of momentary political expediency. See generally Cardozo, Judicial Deference to
State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963); Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?,
40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946). State Department directives frequently failed to give reasons
for a suggestion to grant or deny sovereign immunity and did not indicate whether the
Department had resolved the issue on legal or political grounds. See Chemical Nat.
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venez., 420 Pa. 134, 177, 215 A.2d 864, 885 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 822 (1967) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); Note, Sovereign Immunity, 8 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 388, 393-96 (1967). See also Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk,
493 F.2d 1223, 1224 (1st Cir. 1974); Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 615-22 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 357-62 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). In Victory Transport, a
branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce chartered a vessel owned by a United States
shipping company for the delivery of grain from the United States to various Spanish ports.
Id. at 356. The vessel was damaged while discharging the grain in Spanish ports that were
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theory of sovereign immunity by providing in certain circumstances for
federal court jurisdiction over foreign governments and their commer-
cial corporations. 17 Congress, however, intended the Act to promote
uniformity of decision by substituting unbiased judicial decisions based
on statutory guidelines for the more political decisions of the State
Department on issues of sovereign immunity.18
Several courts considering claims against foreign corporations have
examined whether section 1330 of the Act is the exclusive basis for
federal jurisdiction and whether section 1330's denial of trial by jury
violates the seventh amendment. In Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 9
the court held that the Act does not preclude federal courts from retain-
ing diversity jurisdiction against a foreign government owned corpora-
tion. The plaintiff in Icenogle brought a wrongful death action against
Olympic Airways (Olympic), a corporation owned and controlled entirely
by the government of Greece. 0 The plaintiff alleged diversity jurisdic-
tion under section 1332 and demanded a jury trial.2' Olympic argued that
section 1330 of the Act constituted the exclusively applicable jurisdic-
tional statute and moved to strike the demand for a jury trial.' The
Icenogle court interpreted the language of section 13321 to include a
grant of federal jurisdiction over foreign government owned corpora-
tions.24 The Icenogle court thereby avoided the seventh amendment
issue whether Congress could preclude a plaintiff from a jury trial under
allegedly unsafe for a vessel of that size. Id The vessel's owners brought suit against the
Spanish charterer in the Southern District of New York, and the charterer claimed the bar
of sovereign immunity. Id. at 355-57. The district court held that no sovereign immunity ex-
isted and the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 355-56. The Second Circuit enumerated five
categories of activities performed by states that qualify under the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. These categories were: (1) internal administrative acts, (2) legislative
acts, (3) acts concerning the armed forces, (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, and (5)
public loans. Id. at 360. The Second Circuit found that the act of chartering a vessel for the
carriage of wheat fell outside of the five categories and, therefore, held that the Comisaria
General was not entitled to sovereign immunity. Id at 360-62.
1 See note 4 supra.
15 See House Report, supra note 3, at 6607; note 15 supra.
'9 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979).
Id. Icenogle consolidated wrongful death actions brought by the estates of two
citizens of Wisconsin and one citizen of New York against Olympic Airways. Id. at 36-37.
The decedents perished when one of the defendant's commercial airplanes crashed en route
between two cities in Greece. Id.
" Id. at 37; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). Section 1332(a)(2) grants the federal
district courts diversity jurisdiction over civil actions between "citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state." Id.
' 82 F.R.D. at 37. In Icenogle, the defendant airline initially challenged both the
court's jurisdiction and venue. Id The defendant later withdrew the challenges and admit-
ted liability. Id.
See note 21 supra; text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
24 82 F.R.D. at 38.
19811 1215
1216 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
the Act.25 The court indicated that avoiding the constitutional issue was
the primary rationale for permitting diversity jurisdiction against
foreign government owned corporations.26
In contrast to Icenogle, the procedural history of Williams v. Ship-
ping Corp. of India2' required the Williams court to determine the con-
stitutionality of the Act's preclusion of jury trials.28 In Williams, a
United States longshoreman brought a personal injury action against a
shipping corporation owned entirely by the government of India., The
plaintiff initiated his suit in Virginia state court and the defendant exer-
cised a right of removal to federal court as permitted under section 1441
of the Act.2 Section 1441 allows foreign government owned corporations
sued in a state court to remove the action to the federal district court of
the district where the action is pending and states that actions removed
to the federal court system shall be tried without juries."' The Williams
court held that section 1330 of the Act, triggered in this instance by sec-
tion 1441, constituted the exclusive grant of federal jurisdiction over a
foreign government owned corporation.2 The Williams court then held
" Id. at 39-40; see text accompanying notes 72-80 infra. The Icenogle interpretation of
section 1332 follows a judicially created rule of construction that requires courts to avoid in-
terpreting statutes in ways that raise constitutional issues unless such an interpretation is
inescapable. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416
U.S. 363, 365 (1974). The Icenogle court, however, may have overemphasized the importance
of avoiding the constitutional issue created by section 1330's preclusion of jury trials,
especially since avoiding the issue required the court to ignore congressional statements in
the legislative history accompanying the Act. See Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores, S.A., 639 F.2d 872, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1981). Moreover, the constitutionality of the
Act's preclusion of jury trials arises whenever a foreign government owned corporation
sued in a state court seeks removal to the federal court system. See text accompanying
notes 30-31 infra.
" 82 F.R.D. at 40. See also Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp.
459, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In Rex, a United States longshoremen brought a personal injury ac-
tion against a shipping corporation owned entirely by the government of Peru. 493 F. Supp.
at 460-61. The plaintiff was injured while unloading one of the defendant's vessels, and
brought his action pursuant to section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harborworker's
Compensation Act (LHWCA). Id at 459; see 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). The Rex court followed
the Icenogle analysis and granted diversity jurisdiction under section 1332. 493 F. Supp. at
466-67. The Rex court also developed an alternative means of avoiding the constitutional
issue presented by section 1330's denial of jury trials. The Rex court granted jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows the federal courts to assert jurisdiction over causes of
action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id. at 467-69;
see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). The Rex court concluded that an action arising under section
905(b) of the LHWCA presents a federal question permitting the assertion of jurisdiction
under section 1331. 493 F. Supp. at 467-68.
489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Memorandum Order).
Id. at 28-30.
Id- at 527.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
3' See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
s 489 F. Supp. at 528; see text accompanying notes 46-64 infra.
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that the Act's denial of jury trials in sections 1330 and 1441 was constitu-
tional." The Williams court reasoned that a suit against a foreign
government owned corporation was not a suit at common law within the
meaning of the seventh amendment and therefore held that the amend-
ment was inapplicable.'
In Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A.," the Second Cir-
cuit agreed with the Williams court and held that section 1330 of the Act
was exclusive of section 1332 diversity jurisdiction and that section 1330
did not violate the seventh amendment. Ruggiero consolidated three
personal injury actions involving United States longshoremen as plain-
tiffs and foreign government owned shipping companies as defendants. 6
The plaintiffs asserted diversity jurisdiction under section 1332 and
moved for jury trials.37 The defendants argued that jurisdiction existed
exclusively under section 1330 of the Act and, therefore, moved to strike
the demands for jury trials." The district judge concluded in each case
that jurisdiction existed only under section 1330 of the Act and,
therefore, granted the motions to strike the demands for jury trials. 9
The district judge, however, certified the jury trial issue for immediate
interlocutory appeal because the issue raised a difficult question of law
upon which other district courts had reached conflicting conclusions.
4
1
Consequently, the Second Circuit could not avoid the constitutionality of
section 1330's denial of jury trials as had the Icenogle court.4' The Se-
cond Circuit first found that section 1330 of the Act operated exclusively
of diversity jurisdiction under section 1332.42 The Second Circuit then
followed the Williams analysis and held that the Act's denial of jury
trials did not violate the seventh amendment. 4 The Second Circuit also
indicated that the Act's denial of jury trials against foreign government
owned corporations benefits international relations by ameliorating the
Act's restriction of the sovereign immunity of foreign governments and
their corporations."
489 F. Supp. at 532.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 73-81 infra.
639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 873. The plaintiffs in Ruggiero incurred personal injuries in New York while
unloading the defendant's vessels. Id. The plaintiffs brought personal injury actions pur-
suant to section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Id.;
see 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). The defendant shipping companies were wholly owned sub-
sidiaries of the governments of Peru, Poland, and Indonesia. 639 F.2d at 873.
639 F.2d at 873.
3 Id.
I See Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 498 F. Supp. 10, 12-14 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) (Memorandum Decision and Order), affd, 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 14; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) (interlocutory appeals statute); note 7 supra.
41 See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
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The Icenogle court's conclusion differed from that of the Williams
and Ruggiero courts because the Icenogle court relied on the traditional
application of section 1332 to foreign government owned corporations. 5
Section 1332 grants federal diversity jurisdiction in actions involving
"citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."" The
Icenogle court reasoned that a foreign government owned corporation is
a citizen or subject of a foreign state and consequently is subject to
diversity jurisdiction.47 The Icenogle interpretation follows the tradi-
tional legal fiction that foreign corporations are citizens or subjects of the
foreign state in which they are incorporated." The Act, however, ap-
parently modifies this fiction in regard to corporations that are owned or
operated by a foreign state." Section 1603 of the Act defines foreign
government owned corporations as "foreign states" rather than "citi-
zens or subjects of a foreign state."50 Section 1603's definition indicates
that Congress intended to preclude the federal courts from asserting
diversity jurisdiction over foreign government owned corporations by
"5 See 82 F.R.D. at 37-39.
"8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
" See 82 F.R.D. at 37-38.
"s See Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898); National S.S. Co. v. Tugman,
106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882). The Barrow and Tugman decisions simply extended the legal fic-
tion under which privately owned United States corporations were citizens of the statb of
their incorporation. See Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28
(1853); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555
(1844). See generally Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty,
94 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 202-228 (1946); Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity Juris-
diction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1426, 1427-30 (1964); Warren,
Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 VA. L. REv. 661, 661 (1933).
" See text accompanying notes 50-64 infra.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976). Section 1603(a) states that "a 'foreign state' . . . in-
cludes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state. . ." Id. Section 1603(b) defines "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" as
"any entity- (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an
organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof." 28
U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976); see House Report, supra note 3, at 6613-14. Several recent decisions
have relied upon the definition of a foreign state found in section 1603(a). See, e.g., Carey v.
National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (corporation wholly owned by Libyan
government a "foreign state" for jurisdictional immunity purposes); Herman v. El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd., 502 F. Supp. 277, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (foreign government owned airline a
"foreign state" under section 1603(a)); United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609, 610-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (joinder of U.S.S.R. and Soviet Ministry
of Culture as co-defendants proper in light of Ministry's supervision of commercial negotia-
tions between United States plaintiff and Soviet defendant); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novisti
Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849,851-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (63% Soviet ownership and essentially
public nature of foreign press agency establish that agency is "foreign state"). But see
Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Yugoslavian power plant operated by "worker's organization" not an "agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state"). See generally 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 165 (1979).
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destroying the fiction that such corporations are foreign citizens or sub-
jects."
The legislative history of the Act reenforces the Williams and Rug-
giero construction of sections 1330 and 1332.52 The legislative history in-
dicates that section 1330's comprehensive treatment of jurisdiction in ac-
tions against foreign states renders superfluous a similar basis under
section 1332.1 The Icenogle court, however, noted that the term "foreign
state" as used in the legislative history may mean a "foreign govern-
ment" rather than a "foreign state" as defined in section 1603 of the
Act." Consequently, the Icenogle court declined to interpret the term
"foreign state" as used in the legislative history to include foreign
govenment owned corporations. 5 Similarly, the Icenogle court noted
that section 1603 of the Act is a part of Chapter 97 of Title 28 and ex-
pressly limits the applicability of its definition of "foreign state" to
Chapter 97.5' Since section 1332 is not a part of Chapter 97, the Icenogle
court held that section 1603's definition of a foreign state should not in-
fluence the interpretation of section 1332.11 The Icenogle court,
therefore, held that although a foreign government owned corporation is
a foreign state under section 1330, the same corporation is a foreign
citizen or subject under section 1332.51 The Icenogle interpretation of
sections 1330 and 1332, however, renders section 1441 of the Act un-
necessary. 9 Congress had no reason to deny the right to jury trials in
removed cases involving foreign government owned corporations, but
not in actions originally brought in the federal court system."
The 1976 amendment of section 1332 further indicates that Congress
intended to deny diversity jurisdiction in actions against foreign govern-
ment owned corporations." Prior to 1976, section 1332 permitted federal
diversity jurisdiction over suits between "citizens of a State, and foreign
, See 639 F.2d at 875; 489 F. Supp. at 528.
1" See 639 F.2d at 876-78; 489 F. Supp. at 528; text accompanying note 53 infra.
13 See House Report supra note 3, at 6613.
" See 82 F.R.D. at 40; note 50 supra. Prior to the Act, courts interpreted the term
"foreign state" to mean "other nations" and "other countries." See Republique Francaise v.
M. K. & T. R. Co., 85 F. Supp. 295, 296 (D. Tex. 1949).
82 F.R.D. at 40.
Id. at 38; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976).
', 82 F.R.D. at 38. Section 1332(a)(4) grants federal diversity jurisdiction over actions
brought against a United States citizen by "a foreign state, [as] defined in section 1603(a) of
this title.. ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976). Thus, the Icenogle interpretation of section 1332
may be incorrect since section 1332, read as a whole, does cross-reference to section 1603(a)
of the Act.
1 82 F.R.D. at 38. The Ruggiero court, however, noted that an entity cannot be both a
foreign state and a citizen or subject of a foreign state. 639 F.2d at 875.
"' See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976); text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
'" See 639 F.2d at 876 n.7.
" See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
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states or citizens or subjects thereof."62 The Act, however, amended sec-
tion 1332 by deleting the reference to "foreign states" from the statute's
grant of jurisdiction. 3 Congress apparently intended the amendment of
section 1332 to preclude courts from asserting diversity jurisdiction
over foreign government owned corporations as "foreign states" under
section 1603's broad definition of a foreign state."4 The Icenogle holding
ignores the implications of Congress' broad definition of a "foreign
state" and the effect of that definition had Congress not amended sec-
tion 1332. In contrast, the Williams and Ruggiero opinions give effect to
Congress' broad definition of a "foreign state" by holding that a foreign
government owned corporation is a foreign state suable only under sec-
tion 1330 of the Act, rather than a citizen or subject of a foreign state
subject to diversity jurisdiction under section 1332.
The Williams and Ruggiero construction of sections 1330 and 1332 is
consistent with the probable congressional purpose for denying jury
trials in actions against foreign government owned corporation. 5 Con-
gress recognized that provisions which subjected foreign governments
and their commercial corporations to trial by jury could harm interna-
tional relations." Foreign states might object to their corporations being
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
0 See 639 F.2d at 873-75; 489 F. Supp. at 528; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
See 639 F.2d at 875; 489 F. Supp. at 528.
61 The legislative history accompanying the Act merely notes that jury trials against
foreign sovereigns are excluded under section 1330 to promote "uniformity of decision:' See
House Report, supra note 3, at 6611-12. Congress failed to discuss the jury trial issue fur-
ther and neglected to analyze the seventh amendment issue raised by the Act's denial of
jury trials. See Dellapena, supra note 4, at 499-501 (jury trial issue received "scant" atten-
tion from drafters of the Act); 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 219, 230 n.87 (1980) (proposing
amendment of Act to clarify congressional intent to deny jury trials). Congress apparently
intended the preclusion of jury trials against foreign states, however, for the Act specifically
denies jury trials in two separate sections. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d) (1976) (denying
jury trials in actions coming before federal courts on both direct and removal jurisdiction).
According to the legislative history of the Act, Congress determined that shifting
the power to decide issues of sovereign immunity from the Executive to the Judicial branch
would benefit international relations and the conduct of the United States' foreign affairs by
resolving issues of sovereign immunity with greater objectivity and uniformity. See House
Report, supra note 3, at 6607. The Act's restriction of sovereign immunity to the noncom-
mercial or "public" acts of foreign states probably accords with customary international
law. Id. at 6613. The courts of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Egypt, Austria, Switzerland, Ireland,
Canada, Pakistan, and the United States follow restrictive theories of sovereign immunity.
See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 n. 1 (3d ed. 1979). See also
Deak, ORGANS OF STATES IN THEIR EXTERNAL RELATIONS: IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF
STATE ORGANS AND OF THE STATE § 7.5 in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967);
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. YB
INT'L L. 220, 223 (1951); von Mehren, supra note 10, at 36-37. The Soviet bloc and other com-
munist or socialist nations, however, adhere to a theory of absolute sovereign immunity and
therefore some authorities argue that the restrictive theory adopted by the Act may not be
an accepted rule of customary international law. See Brownlie, supra, at 328 n.5. See
generally, L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 496-98 (1980);
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subject to American juries, particularly if they do not employ the jury
system in their domestic law or are generally unpopular in the United
States.17 Communist nations could be particularly hostile to jury trials in
the United States, since such nations make no distinction between the
commercial and noncommercial acts of a sovereign state and, therefore,
adhere to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.68 Additionally,
developing nations that find massive government involvement in com-
mercial affairs an economic necessity could view hostile jury verdicts as
an attempt by the United States to dominate their economies and con-
trol the disposition of their natural resources.69
The Act's requirement of non-jury trials also eliminates the possibil-
ity for abuse of the jury process which is present in actions against
foreign governments and their commercial corporations."0 Parochialism
and national prejudice sway far fewer judges than juries, particularly
since judges are more sensitive to the possibility of appellate review and
reversal for error. 1 By subjecting foreign government owned corpora-
tions to federal jurisdiction only under the Act, and thereby denying
jury trials against such corporations, the Williams and Ruggiero courts
LISSITZYN, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 188-201 (1972).
11 See 639 F.2d at 880; 13 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 219, 228-31 (1980). Commentators
have noted that procedures which are acceptable under the domestic law of the United
States may be considered unacceptable by foreign governments. For example, United
States procedures for longarm jurisdiction and the assertion of extraterritorial judicial
power may exceedthe jurisdictional standards of foreign states. See von Mehren & Traut-
man, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (1966).
See note 66 supra.
89 See A Statutory Approach, supra note 4, at 260-61. Developing nations are par-
ticularly hostile to efforts by developed nations to control the natural resources of newly in-
dependent countries. Id.
" See 639 F.2d at 880. Courts might minimize the potential for abuse of the jury pro-
cess in actions against foreign government owned corporations by exercising strict control
over the jury's actions and decisions. See 13 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 219, 229 (1980). Courts
could use such control devices as additur, remititur, directed or special verdicts, or judg-
ment n.o.v. to avoid the suspicion of unfairness to foreign government owned corporations
sued under the Act. Id. Such control devices, however, could prove cumbersome and time-
consuming and might in many cases prove ineffective in convincing foreign states that pas-
sion or prejudice did not infect the verdict.
71 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435-41 (1967). The issue in Zschernig was the
constitutionality of an Oregon probate statute that allowed a non-resident alien heir to take
personalty only if the alien's foreign country would permit a United States citizen to take
personalty under similar circumstances. Id. at 430-32. The Court held that the Oregon
statute was an unconstitutional intrusion by the state into the foreign affairs power of the
President and of Congress. Id. at 432. The Zschernig Court noted several extremely
parochial and nationalistic statements made by state judges while applying Oregon's or
similar "reciprocity" statutes. Id. at 436-41. Zschernig demonstrates that the Court' would
not fail to harshly criticize unobjective decision-making by courts in issues involving foreign
governments and foreign government owned corporations. See generally 8 VA. J. INTt L.
419, 426 n.10 (1968); 13 VILL. L. REV. 672, 676 (1968).
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promoted the congressional desire to avoid adverse effects on foreign
relations through the passage of the Act."
In addition, the Act's denial of trial by jury in actions against foreign
government owned corporations is not inconsistent with the seventh
amendment." The seventh amendment preserves rather than expands
the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law.74 Ordinarily, if the
right to a jury trial for a particular cause of action existed in England in
1791, then the seventh amendment maintains that right.5 The seventh
amendment, however, does not guarantee the right to a jury trial where
no right to enforce similar legal claims existed at common law. 8 No right
to a jury trial in an action against a foreign sovereign existed at common
law, because at that time all nations followed a theory of absolute
sovereign immunity which totally precluded suits against foreign
sovereigns.7 An examination of the history of the seventh amendment
r See note 66 supra.
7s See 639 F.2d at 880-81; 489 F. Supp. at 531-32.
' See 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 38.08 [5], at 38-55 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE's]. The seventh amendment states that "[iln suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
U.S. Const. amend VII. Courts traditionally have protected the right to jury trials in civil
actions. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (right to jury trial in civil actions fundamental to Anglo-American legal system);
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 398 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (right to jury trial
in civil action "the very palladium of free government"); Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752,
753 (1942) (seventh amendment protection a fundamental and sacred right).
"' See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 543 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 5 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.05, at 38-55; Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1973).
78 See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 449 & 459 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 367, 375 (1974); Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974). In Atlas, the Supreme Court held that the seventh amendment did
not require jury trials in OSHA proceedings, because administrative agencies and pro-
ceedings were unknown at common law. See 430 U.S. at 449-55. Curtis raised the issue
whether the seventh amendment requires jury trials in actions arising under the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976). 415 U.S. at 190. The Curtis court held that the
seventh amendment required a jury trial in actions arising under the Civil Rights Act. Id. at
191. The Court reasoned that claims arising under the Civil Rights Act constitute actions to
enforce "legal rights" of the sort guaranteed a jury trial by the seventh amendment. Id. at
196.
The Supreme Court refined the Curtis analysis in Pernell. The issue in Pernell was
whether eviction proceedings brought under the District of Columbia Housing Code re-
quired a jury trial under the seventh amendment. 416 U.S. at 364. The Pernell court reasoned
that a jury trial was proper because the action was similar in function to various common
law actions traditionally held to require jury trials. Id. at 375.
11 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137-40 (1812). The
Exchange Court determined that international law required the adoption of a theory of ab-
solute sovereign immunity. Id. at 137-38. The Exchange Court reasoned that through an im-
plied contract all sovereign nations have agreed not to assert domestic jurisdiction over one
another, in order to benefit comity and facilitate trade, intercourse, and the conduct of
diplomatic affairs. Id.; see O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 916; von Mehren, supra note 10, at
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fails to indicate clearly whether the absolute theory of sovereign im-
munity would have precluded suits at common law against corporations
owned or operated by foreign sovereigns. 8 The issue never arose,
because foreign government owned corporations did not exist in that
time period.19 Nevertheless, courts at common law could have extended
sovereign immunity to foreign government owned corporations had such
corporations then existed." The drafters of the seventh amendment,
therefore, probably did not intend suits at common law to include actions
against foreign government owned corporations. 1 The Williams and
Ruggiero courts, therefore, properly determined that the Act's denial of
jury trials does not violate the seventh amendment.
The Williams and Ruggiero courts correctly held that the Act con-
stitutes the exclusive means of obtaining federal court jurisdiction over
a corporation owned or operated by a foreign government.82 Both deci-
sions properly recognized that the Act's denial of trial by jury benefits
international relations" and does not conflict with the requirements of
35-36. English courts traditionally have followed the Exchange Court's theory of absolute
sovereign immunity. See O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 916-17.
," See 5 MOORE'S, supra note 74, at 38.31.1[2].
" See note 9 supra; note 80 infra.
" In 1812 the United States Supreme Court adopted a theory of absolute sovereign im-
munity, but anticipated the possibility of denying sovereign immunity in suits arising from
the commercial activities of a foreign sovereign. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145 (1812). The Exchange Court indicated that a sovereign ordinarily
did not engage in commerce and noted that a sovereign who did so might waive his immunity
from jurisdiction. Id. at 145. Such a case did not come before the Supreme Court, however,
until 1926, near the beginning of the era of government involvement in commercial ac-
tivities. See Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 572-76 (1926). The Pesaro Court af-
firmed the Exchange Court's theory of absolute sovereign immunity and refused to
distinguish the public and private acts of a foreign sovereign. Id. Other Anglo-American
courts of the same period also adhered to the theory of absolute sovereign immunity. See
The Maipo, 252 F. 627, 628-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), vacated, 259 F. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); The
Jupiter, L.R. [1924] P.D. 30, 32-35; The Gagara, L.R. [1919] P.D. 95, 99-104. The United
Kingdom currently follows the theory of absolute sovereign immunity, although the English
courts seem to be inclining towards the restrictive theory of immunity. See generally Hig-
gins, Recent Developments in the Law of Sovereign Immunity in the United Kingdom, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 423 (1977); White, State Immunity and International Law in English Courts,
26 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 674 (1977).
" 639 F.2d at 881; 489 F. Supp. at 532.
', See text accompanying notes 46-64 supra. The Ruggiero court held that section 1330
of the Act operated exclusively of both federal diversity jurisdiction under section 1332 and
federal question jurisdiction under section 1331. See 639 F.2d at 876; note 26 supra. The
Ruggiero court noted that Congress had no reason to allow a plaintiff a jury trial if he sued
a foreign state for an alleged violation of a law of the United States, but not otherwise. 639
F.2d at 876.
1 See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra. Two courts have interpreted the Act to
require bifurcated trials, with the court determining issues of sovereign immunity, and the
jury determining issues of liability and damages. See Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co.,
87 F.R.D. 71, 73 (D. Md. 1980); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 396 (D.
Del. 1978). Such an interpretation may avoid the constitutional issue whether the Act's
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the seventh amendment.84 Williams and Ruggiero implement the Act in
a manner which promotes comity by assuring foreign governments that
the corporations they own or operate will receive objective treatment in
United States courts.85
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denial of trial by jury violates the seventh amendment. See Dellapena, supra note 4, at 501.
Moreover, the bifurcated trial would not harm uniformity of decision in the resolution of
issues of sovereign immunity. Id; see text accompanying note 17 supra. Nevertheless, the
bifurcated trial solution is unacceptable because it could harm international comity by sub-
jecting foreign governments and their commercial corporations to trial by jury. See text ac-
companying notes 65-71 supra.
See text accompanying notes 73-81 supra.
See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra.
